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Abstract 15 
 16 
The topic of Greenhouse Gas Removal (GGR) for climate geoengineering is becoming 17 
increasingly salient following the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report and the Paris Agreement. GGR 18 
is thought of as a separate category to mitigation techniques such as low-carbon supply or 19 
demand reduction, yet multiple social, ethical and acceptability concerns cut across categories. 20 
We propose moving beyond classifying climate strategies as a set of discrete categories (which 21 
may implicitly homogenise diverse technologies), towards a prioritisation of questions of scale 22 
of both technology and decision-making in the examination of social and ethical risks. This is 23 
not just a theoretical issue: important questions for policy, governance and finance are raised, for 24 
instance over the future inclusion of GGR in carbon markets. We argue that the conclusions 25 
drawn about how best to categorise, govern and incentivise any strategy will depend on the 26 
framing used, because different framings could lead to very different policy recommendations 27 
being drawn. Because of this, a robust approach to developing, governing and financing GGR 28 
should pay attention first to urgent concerns regarding democracy, justice and acceptability.  29 
 30 
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1 Introduction 1 
 2 
The topic of geoengineering – “The deliberate, large-scale manipulation of the planetary 3 
environment in order to counteract anthropogenic climate change” (Royal Society, 2009: 1) – 4 
has been climbing up the scientific and political agenda in recent decades. The Royal Society’s 5 
2009 report on geoengineering distinguished between Solar Radiation Management (SRM, 6 
which aims to reflect a small percentage of the sun’s light and heat back into space) and 7 
Greenhouse Gas Removal (GGR, which aims to remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere). 8 
Until recently, most discussions on the social and ethical aspects of geoengineering have focused 9 
on SRM. However, in the wake of the Paris Agreement and the IPCC’s 5th Assessment report, 10 
the idea of ‘negative emissions’ is becoming increasingly salient (Fuss et al., 2014); accordingly, 11 
questions are being raised regarding the social, ethical and policy implications of GGR (Table 1 12 
gives an overview of major GGR technologies). 13 
 14 
Table 1: Some major GGR proposals. Adapted from Olson (2011). 15 
Method Description Concerns 
Afforestation / 
reforestation 
Planting trees or reforesting previously 
deforested areas 
• Land-use conflicts between reforestation and agriculture 
• Carbon stored in vegetation can easily be released by 
fire, drought or deliberate deforestation 
Soil Carbon 
Sequestration (SCS) 
Changing land management and farming 
practices to increase the carbon content of 
soil  
• Soils eventually reach saturation  
• Vulnerable to disturbance (e.g. later land-use changes) 
• May increase release of other greenhouse gases from 
soil, e.g. NOx 
Wetland restoration Restoring or constructing carbon-dense 
ecosystems such as wetlands, peatlands and 
coastal ecosystems.  
• Increased production of non-CO2 gases such as methane 
• Relatively limited global sequestration potential 
• Competition for land 
Bioenergy with 
Carbon Capture and 
Sequestration 
(BECCS) 
Biomass used as fuel for electricity 
generation or hydrogen production, with 
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) of the 
resulting CO2.1 
• Fuel vs. food: incentive for biomass production can 
reduce the availability and increase the cost of food crops 
• Environmental impacts of intensive growing 
• Availability and safety of sequestration sites 
Biochar Agricultural and forestry wastes burned 
through pyrolysis to produce biochar 
(charcoal), which is sequestered in the soil. 
• Supply of biomass wastes 
• Long-term impacts of high biochar applications not yet 
known 
Terrestrial Enhanced 
Weathering (EW) 
Rock weathering processes accelerated by 
finely crushing rocks and spreading them 
on agricultural soils. Rocks weather to 
produce carbonates, which sink into the 
deep ocean, sequestering the carbon they 
contain. 
• Requires mining, processing and transportation of large 
quantities of crushed rock, with high energy use and costs 
• Uncertainties about impacts on soil pH and vegetation 
• Possible leaching of heavy metals into soils and crops 
Direct Air Capture 
(DAC) 
Industrial processes to extract CO2 from 
ambient air for sequestration. 
• Technically feasible, but not clear if cost effective 
processes can be developed 
• Availability and safety of sequestration sites 
                                                          
1 CCS is an important component of GGR technologies such as BECCS and Direct Air Capture, as a means of storing 
the captured CO2. However, CCS does not always result in net negative emissions: for example, on a fossil fuel 
plant CCS reduces the CO2 emitted and is therefore best thought of as mitigation technology. 
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Ocean Fertilisation Adding iron, nitrogen or phosphates to 
ocean water as nutrients to stimulate the 
growth of phytoplankton that absorb CO2 
during photosynthesis. Some of this organic 
matter sinks into the deep ocean, 
sequestering the carbon it contains. 
• Potential disruption of the ocean carbon system 
• May increase “dead zones” of the ocean 
• Not as effective as hoped for removing carbon 
 1 
 2 
As a starting point, it may not make sense to discuss diverse technologies under a blanket term 3 
such as ‘geoengineering’ (Asayama et al., 2017; Bellamy et al., 2013; Cairns and Stirling, 2014; 4 
Olson, 2012); in fact, Bellamy and Lezaun (2017) posit that recent discourses have deliberately 5 
sought to ‘unframe’ geoengineering as a distinct object of debate. Heyward (2013) offers a 6 
useful typology for understanding different categories of response to climate change (table 2); 7 
GGR and mitigation both seek to reduce atmospheric concentrations of Greenhouse Gases 8 
(GHGs), but GGR removes previously-emitted GHGs from the earth system, whereas mitigation 9 
seeks to avoid the emissions in the first place. However, complications with these definitions 10 
soon arise elsewhere, with the UNFCCC classing the enhancement of carbon sinks as mitigation 11 
(United Nations, 1992), and the Convention on Biological Diversity stating that some GGR 12 
techniques such as afforestation “are also considered climate mitigation techniques” (Williamson 13 
and Bodle, 2016: 8). In fact, Lomax et al. (2015b: 126) argue that the distinction between GGR 14 
and mitigation is “in many ways artificial and is an unconstructive basis for developing effective 15 
policy”. Meanwhile Scheer and Renn (2014), in an exploration of experts’ views, find that 16 
considerable similarities are drawn between geoengineering and certain contentious mitigation 17 
options such as nuclear power.  18 
 19 
In this article we examine some of the social, ethical and acceptability concerns which have been 20 
raised over geoengineering, and look at them in the light of various GGR and mitigation 21 
strategies, to highlight the considerable overlap between categories. This is important for two 22 
reasons: firstly, because most of the literature on GGR focuses on economic and technical 23 
feasibility, without considering social barriers (Buck, 2016); and secondly, because this issue 24 
raises important practical questions regarding the governance and financing of climate 25 
engineering techniques. Section 2 examines three important ethical themes which whilst 26 
typically raised about geoengineering can also apply to many mitigation technologies, and 27 
demonstrates that several technologies exist in a sort of ethical ‘grey area’ between the two. On 28 
the basis of this, we propose moving beyond classifying climate strategies as a set of discrete 29 
categories, towards a prioritisation of questions of scale (of both technology and decision-30 
making) in the examination of social and ethical risks. In section 3 we then examine the policy 31 
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and governance implications of this proposal, arguing that there is so single ‘desirable’ way of 1 
categorising, governing or incentivising GGR, because it depends on how the problem and the 2 
technology is framed. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that the ethical development of any 3 
technologically-advanced climate strategy needs to urgently address concerns regarding 4 
democracy, justice and acceptability. 5 
 6 
Table 2: A typology of five climate strategies (adapted from Heyward, 2013) 7 
Aim Avoiding a given level of atmospheric 
GHG concentration 
Avoiding global 
average temperature 
increases 
Ensuring that rising 
temperatures do not 
impact upon core 
interests 
Providing redress 
for injuries to core 
interests 
Strategy Mitigation  
Reducing GHG 
emissions 
Greenhouse Gas 
Removal (GGR) 
Drawing GHGs out 
of the atmosphere 
Solar Radiation 
Management (SRM) 
Increasing albedo 
Adaptation 
Reducing the 
impacts of high 
atmospheric GHG 
concentration 
Rectification 
Financial 
compensation, 
symbolic reparation 
Examples Wind turbines; 
Electric Vehicles; 
Energy demand 
reduction 
Afforestation, 
BECCS; Enhanced 
Weathering 
Stratospheric Aerosol 
Injection; Mirrors in 
space 
Improved irrigation; 
Flood defences; 
Protection against 
disease 
Compensating flood 
victims; Suing high-
emitting 
governments  
 8 
 9 
2 Social, ethical and political concerns 10 
 11 
2.1 Treating the symptoms? 12 
A common critique of geoengineering is that unlike mitigation it merely treats the symptoms of 13 
climate change rather than reducing the cause (i.e. high concentrations of atmospheric GHGs) 14 
(Anshelm and Hansson, 2014; ETC Group and Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2017; Wibeck et al., 15 
2017). However, GGR draws GHGs out of the atmosphere after they are emitted, thus raising the 16 
question of whether it treats the symptoms or the cause. In fact, Ipsos Mori (2010) 17 
controversially presented GGR as ‘addressing the root cause’ of climate change (cf. Corner et 18 
al., 2011); however, if we take the cause of climate change to be the irresponsible burning of 19 
fossil fuels, GGR may be viewed as another treatment of symptoms which still fails to address 20 
unsustainable patterns of production and consumption (Anderson, 2015; Hamilton, 2010; 21 
Stirling, 2014). This issue is important from a justice perspective, because a technology which 22 
supports incumbent systems might also perpetuate existing inequalities. Gardiner (2010) argues 23 
that it is unjust for Western elites responsible for high emissions to call for a techno-fix which 24 
doesn’t address underlying systems of inequality.  For example, some GGR proposals, such as 25 
biomass with carbon capture (BECCS) and Enhanced Weathering (EW), could require large 26 
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amounts of land in tropical areas with historically low emissions, and there are understandable 1 
concerns regarding how fair this would be on the local inhabitants (Lawford-Smith and Currie, 2 
2017; McLaren, 2016). Temporal justice is also potentially a problem: both GGR and SRM 3 
arouse questions of intergenerational equity (Wong, 2014), because assuming that we can emit 4 
what we like now and simply rely on negative emissions later may constitute an unacceptable 5 
transfer of risk onto future generations (Hansen et al., 2017; Lawford-Smith and Currie, 2017; 6 
Shue, 2017). 7 
 8 
Concern over techno-fixes is not exclusively the domain of geoengineering: many mitigation 9 
options have been critiqued on the same grounds, especially large supply-side proposals such as 10 
nuclear power or big hydroelectric dams. In fact, for BECCS, the majority of equity concerns 11 
actually relate to the mitigation technology (the biomass) rather than the carbon removal 12 
technology. Some GGR proposals might impact oceans or waterways (e.g. EW, Ocean 13 
Fertilisation), and concerns are similar for any mitigation strategy which impacts water 14 
ecosystems and communities relying on them. It could be argued that even demand-side 15 
mitigation is not immune to equity and justice problems, because the middle classes in emerging 16 
economies will probably be responsible for considerable energy demand growth in the future 17 
(particularly from difficult-to-decarbonise sectors such as aviation and meat consumption), and it 18 
may be ethically challenging to dictate that these emerging middle classes must now alter their 19 
diets or avoid foreign holidays because of historical emissions in Western nations.  20 
 21 
Each of the climate strategies described above are large-scale, requiring large infrastructural, 22 
environmental or societal alteration. Many mitigation techniques can be carried out on a small-23 
scale, thus engendering fewer equity and justice issues; the problems only start emerging when 24 
the scale is increased. For example, there are few equity challenges associated with small solar 25 
co-operatives or domestic micro-generation, but it’s not difficult to envisage the potential social 26 
and ecosystem impacts of huge solar electricity export projects such as ‘Desertec’ in North 27 
Africa. Similarly, micro-hydro schemes will usually be less problematic than big dams, as 28 
evidenced by comparing the Three Gorges Dam to any number of micro-hydro projects in 29 
China. It could be the same for GGR: a salient example is afforestation, which on a small scale 30 
can create co-benefits, but on a larger scale has been implicated in land-grabbing and 31 
biodiversity loss (Cotula, 2009; Fleurke, 2013), for example in the case of the New Forests 32 
Company which displaced more than 15,000 people in Uganda to plant trees (Grainger and 33 
Geary, 2011). More technologically-advanced proposals such as EW and Direct Air Capture 34 
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(DAC) could also be carried out on a very small scale; but similarly to mitigation, small-scale 1 
projects may struggle to benefit from economies of scale, and they will (individually) result in 2 
smaller GHG reductions.  3 
 4 
2.2 Democracy and plurality 5 
Connected to questions of justice are concerns about democracy and who makes the decisions 6 
regarding the world that we live in. Gardiner (2010) argues that geoengineering would affect 7 
everyone, therefore it’s unjust for decisions to be left up to elites or ‘experts’. Certainly, at 8 
present, most geoengineering activities are carried out in a very centralised and top-down 9 
manner, and the term ‘Geoclique’ has even been used to describe the small group of (mainly 10 
white, male) proponents of geoengineering (Buck et al., 2014; Porter and Hulme, 2013). Stirling 11 
(2014) argues that the very concept of geoengineering automatically assumes control of earth 12 
systems by one small group of people. For example, climate change institutions such as the 13 
IPCC and UNFCCC recommend GGR on the basis of Integrated Assessment Models which 14 
show that it is needed to avoid catastrophic climate change; yet that entire proposition, including 15 
the institutions and experts involved, the models and methods used, and the framings employed 16 
(‘necessity’, ‘catastrophe’) have all been determined in a rather exclusive manner. Of course, 17 
many mitigation projects and decisions are also carried out in a centralised and non-participatory 18 
way, but proponents of more radical emissions reductions would argue that we need a societal 19 
transformation away from such top-down decision-making, which may be incompatible with 20 
expensive, technologically-advanced GGR proposals (McLaren, 2016). 21 
 22 
Public perceptions and the ‘acceptability’ of GGR are likely to be just as important as 23 
technological and economic feasibility (Beerling, 2017; Corner and Pidgeon, 2010). Risk frames 24 
are central to understanding social context, and whether GGR is framed as a climate mitigation 25 
strategy or part of geoengineering will likely influence how these technologies are interpreted.  26 
Support is also likely to be conditional (Pidgeon and Spence, 2017), as well as being correlated 27 
with people’s underlying values (Corner and Pidgeon, 2014; Gregory et al., 2016). Similar 28 
characteristics of conditional acceptance and ambivalence have been identified for many 29 
mitigation options such as nuclear power (Bickerstaff et al., 2008), and for public attitudes 30 
towards low-carbon energy systems more generally (Corner and Pidgeon, 2010; Demski et al., 31 
2015). Under such circumstances it is less important to ask whether any technology is in some 32 
way ‘acceptable’ or not, but rather to identify the conditions under which a project or scheme 33 
might in the future become acceptable for most people (Pidgeon and Demski, 2012). 34 
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Importantly, for most risky technologies, perceptions and acceptability are both complex 1 
(Devine-Wright et al., 2009; Persson et al., 2015; Pidgeon et al., 1992) and can be subject to 2 
dynamic change (Pidgeon et al., 2003). For example, Lin (2013) demonstrates that previously 3 
taboo subjects can quickly become normalised: the idea of climate adaptation, which is now a 4 
central goal of global climate policy and is seen as imperative to redress the inequities of climate 5 
impacts, was once considered morally problematic for many of the same reasons as 6 
geoengineering.  7 
 8 
2.3 Mitigation deterrence 9 
One of the major arguments against geoengineering is that it could reduce incentives for 10 
stringent mitigation (Campbell-Arvai et al., 2017; Corner and Pidgeon, 2014; Hamilton, 2010; 11 
McLaren et al., 2016). If this were the case for GGR, future generations could be responsible for 12 
maintaining projects indefinitely, as GGR won’t address the underlying causes of unsustainable 13 
fossil fuel combustion (Jamieson, 2013; Lawford-Smith and Currie, 2017; Preston, 2016, 2013; 14 
Wong, 2014). As stated by Wong (2014:190), GGR should be seen not as a one-off event, but as 15 
a “temporally-extended process”. Although empirical work on the mitigation deterrence effects 16 
of GGR is ongoing (see for example Markusson et al., 2017), it is clear that the concept of GGR 17 
has created a unique framing of climate strategy which relies heavily on novel technologies 18 
which do not yet exist at scale (Anderson and Peters, 2016).  However, these issues could also 19 
apply to mitigation options such as nuclear power and fossil CCS, which are widely agreed not 20 
to qualify as geoengineering, but experience similar concerns regarding lock-in and mitigation 21 
deterrence (Lee and Gloaguen, 2015; Markusson and Haszeldine, 2009; Unruh and Carrillo-22 
Hermosilla, 2006). For example, McLaren et al. (2013) describe evidence for a policy preference 23 
for CCS over other means of reducing emissions in multiple OECD countries and US states; 24 
they argue that alongside the failure of demonstration projects such as Longannet in Scotland, 25 
this has resulted in overreliance on CCS, thus increasing climate change risk via the same 26 
mechanisms as overreliance on GGR in climate policy. Clearly, the failure of rapid CCS 27 
development provides important lessons for novel GGR, yet also reveals the complexities behind 28 
proposals to ‘focus on reducing emissions first and foremost’; we shall return to this topic in the 29 
next section. 30 
 31 
 32 
 33 
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3 Discussion 1 
 2 
3.1 A question of scale 3 
The preceding text demonstrates that in social and ethical terms, the boundaries between GGR 4 
and mitigation are blurred. It has also indicated that scale (of both the technology and the 5 
decision-making) is an important factor in determining social and ethical risks, because many 6 
climate strategies are relatively innocuous at small scale, but could be problematic at a larger 7 
scale. This is obviously the case for large-scale supply-side mitigation technologies such as 8 
nuclear and large hydro, and perhaps also for large-scale energy demand reduction which itself 9 
is not immune to ethical problems. The Convention on Biological Diversity actually states that 10 
GGR on a small enough scale doesn’t count as geoengineering (Williamson and Bodle, 2016); 11 
given this confusion even in the policy literature, it is worth emphasising that scale is complex 12 
and subjective (Bellamy et al., 2017). For example, a distinction can be made between ‘research’ 13 
and ‘deployment’, with studies showing that the general public are generally more supportive of 14 
research than deployment (Pidgeon and Spence, 2017); however, accurately researching 15 
complex earth system interactions is near impossible in a contained environment, and the line 16 
between ‘research’ and ‘deployment’ becomes increasingly blurred when research  moves from 17 
the lab into a field trial (Tedsen and Homann, 2013). As shown by Bellamy et al. (2017), more 18 
nuanced conceptions of scale such as ‘controllability’ and ‘reversibility’ are likely to be far 19 
better predictors of the acceptability of geoengineering activities than simple technologically-20 
determined conceptions of scale such as ‘research vs deployment’ or ‘large vs small’. Moreover, 21 
scale is clearly not the only determinant of potential social and ethical issues: for example, the 22 
same technology, implemented at the same scale but in different locations, could experience 23 
quite different issues (cf. Cohen et al., 2014; Devine-Wright, 2011; Gannon and Hulme, 2017). 24 
 25 
Fundamental to this entire discussion is the way in which the risks, benefits and scale of GGR 26 
are framed, because assessments of risks are dependent on the framing of assumptions, 27 
especially in the context of deep uncertainty or ignorance (Stilgoe et al., 2013; Stirling, 2010). 28 
For example, framing something as a ‘technology’, a ‘proposal’ or a ‘risk’ has important 29 
implications for its tangibility and perceived efficacy (Bellamy and Lezaun, 2017; Henwood et 30 
al., 2008). Similarly, framing a project as ‘mitigation’ or ‘small-scale’ immediately portrays it in 31 
a certain light, despite the considerable classification complexities discussed throughout this 32 
paper.  There is an extensive literature on the framing of risks and benefits in relation to climate 33 
engineering, which there is not scope here to explore in detail (cf. Bellamy and Lezaun, 2017; 34 
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Cairns and Stirling, 2014; Markusson, 2013; McLaren, 2016; Porter and Hulme, 2013; Preston, 1 
2015); but we shall discuss some of the implications of risk framings in the following section. 2 
 3 
3.2 Implications for policy and governance 4 
We have argued that the line between GGR and mitigation is complex, blurred, and depends on 5 
the technology and the scale at which it’s being implemented. But what practical implications 6 
does this have? In fact, this question is extremely important for policy-making on GGR, 7 
especially regarding finance and incentives. Large-scale afforestation is already eligible for 8 
carbon permits under the Clean Development Mechanism, therefore this finance route may be 9 
proposed for more technologically-advanced GGR such as DAC and EW (Lomax et al., 2015a; 10 
Meadowcroft, 2013). Yet some GGRs are already included in countries’ national mitigation 11 
targets and Nationally Determined Contributions, which means that care needs to be taken to 12 
avoid double-counting of limited resources such as available land. It could be argued that policy 13 
may be experiencing a sort of ‘slippery slope’ between mitigation and GGR, which decision-14 
makers need to be aware of when dealing with the complexities which will doubtless arise when 15 
dealing with novel GGR at scale. Discussion of GGR is often accompanied by sensible 16 
reminders to focus on mitigation first and foremost (e.g. EASAC, 2018); however, in the 17 
existence of such blurred boundaries, this needs ongoing examination of what it means to do 18 
‘mitigation first’, and whether this implies halting the implementation of GGRs such as wetland 19 
restoration and afforestation. To an extent, a case-by-case approach is needed, in terms of both 20 
the technology and the scale of implementation and impacts, as well as other important 21 
considerations such as location. A portfolio of measures will be needed to address climate 22 
change, because of limitations to individual technologies and the importance of diversity for 23 
minimising risk under conditions of deep uncertainty; the challenge (and the subject of ongoing 24 
work) will be to work out what that portfolio might look like, particularly in terms of the techno-25 
economic, social and ethical interactions between technologies.  26 
 27 
Importantly, as discussed in the previous section, the conclusions drawn about how best to 28 
categorise, govern and incentivise any strategy will depend on the framing used. For example, if 29 
the arguments posed in this paper were framed as indicating a ‘slippery slope’ between GGR and 30 
mitigation, this could lead to a conclusion that GGR is in some way unique and that therefore the 31 
distinction should be cemented before the slope becomes too steep. On the other hand, an 32 
opposing framing could lead to a conclusion that GGR is simply a corollary of mitigation 33 
measures already in place, and that therefore the two should be pursued with equal vigour. 34 
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Rather than argue for either of these propositions, we propose taking the discussion back a step, 1 
to acknowledge the points made in section 2 – that large-scale technological climate strategies 2 
are often fraught with concerns regarding democracy, justice and acceptability. Therefore if 3 
GGR projects and proposals are to be pursued, care needs to be taken to make the process more 4 
democratic. One way of doing this could be to support deliberative processes which allow a 5 
diverse range of groups (including non-experts and affected parties) to participate, not only in 6 
governance decisions, but in the very co-creation of novel technologies and the narratives and 7 
framings by which they are discussed.  8 
 9 
4 Conclusion 10 
 11 
This article has explored social and ethical concerns arising in the literature on geoengineering, 12 
focusing on topics of democracy and plurality, mitigation deterrence, and the ability to treat the 13 
root cause of climate change. Using examples of particular technologies and proposals, we have 14 
sought to demonstrate that, in social and ethical terms at least, the boundaries between GGR and 15 
mitigation are rather blurred. Of course, it is often the case that diverse categories of 16 
technologies have overlapping ethical concerns; however, the ethics of GGR and mitigation is a 17 
particularly salient topic at this point in time, due to the sheer scale at which GGR is employed 18 
in many climate mitigation projections. This has led to sensible reminders to focus on mitigation 19 
first and foremost, yet in the existence of such blurred boundaries there is a need to be clear 20 
about what exactly this entails. 21 
 22 
We have argued that the scale of both the technology and the decision-making is an important 23 
factor in determining ethical and social risks, because many climate strategies are relatively 24 
innocuous at small scale, but could be problematic at a larger scale. Because of this, a case-by-25 
case approach to governance and incentivisation could be desirable, whilst improving 26 
understanding of the interactions between technologies. However, we emphasise that the 27 
conclusions drawn about how best to categorise, govern and incentivise any strategy will depend 28 
on the framing used, because different framings of the same conclusions could lead to very 29 
different policy recommendations. Most importantly, we argue that a robust, ethical approach to 30 
developing, governing and financing GGRs – and in fact any large-scale technologically-31 
advanced climate strategy – should pay urgent attention to concerns regarding democracy, 32 
justice and acceptability.  33 
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